



(D)DoS Story

Luboš Klokner

F5 System Engineer


l.klokner@f5.com

+421 908 755152

[@lklokner](https://twitter.com/lklokner) 

Agenda

- Intro
- Main Part
- Tools
- Different sorts of (D)DoS Attacks
- F5 Multilayer (D)DoS Protection
- IPv6
- FW + ADC Deployments
- F5 Application Delivery Firewall



Introduction




F5 Silverline

- Attack mitigation bandwidth capacity over 2.0 Tbps
- Scrubbing capacity of over 1.0 Tbps
- Guaranteed bandwidth with Tier 1 carriers
- Fully redundant and globally distributed data centers world wide in each geographic region
- F5 SOC is available 24/7 with security experts ready to respond to DDoS attacks within minutes




F5 Silverline

- Attack
- Scrub
- Gua
- Fully
- wide
- F5 S
- resp



F5 Silverline

- Attached
- Scrubbed
- Guaranteed
- Fully
- wide
- F5 Silverline
- resp




F5 Silverline

- Attack
- Scrub
- Guarantee
- Full
- wide
- F5 S
- resp

Date
Date
Date
Date

Attack Traffic by IP Origin



world

Brian Krebs



briankrebs @briankrebs

1d

20gbps ddos on my site this afternoon. guess that's what happens when you expose a ddos for hire service krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/israel...



briankrebs @briankrebs

1d

actually make that 128Gpbs. shit just got real.



briankrebs @briankrebs

1d

word from three sources now that vDOS proprietor AppleJ4ck just got raided in Israel. guess that explains a lot.

Brian Krebs



HackedByKyoto @HackedByKyoto

1d

Yo [@briankrebs](#) guess he luck ran out... [twitter.com/AppleJ4ck_vDos...](https://twitter.com/AppleJ4ck_vDos)

Yarden Bidani @AppleJ4ck_vDos

@FBI dns-pub-01-u.pentagon.mil #DDOSED arrest me pussies



briankrebs



briankrebs @briankrebs



Alleged co-owners of attack-for-hire site vDOS arrested in Israel. CEO of a victim company admits to BGP hijacking krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/allege...

vDoS Victims

```
erkacs-MBP:Desktop erkac$ awk -F "," '{ print $4 }' attacks.txt
IPs.txt
erkacs-MBP:Desktop erkac$ wc -l IPs.txt
171003 IPs.txt
erkacs-MBP:Desktop erkac$ sort -u IPs.txt | wc -l
14066
erkacs-MBP:Desktop erkac$
```

These are all the DDoS victims that were logged in the VDoS database dump. The site claims:

51,'DDoS','We're a legitimate stress testing company, not a DDoS service. you from stressing internet connections and/or servers that you do not have owner authorization to test.\r\n\r\nAbuse of our services or use in violation of our service will result in being banned from our services.'

131,'prc','It is necessary to raise our prices due to users stressing home co addresses which they do not have the authorization to do so. If users desire services for legitimate reasons, there shouldn't be an issue when it comes slightly more than they used to. Like Iâ€™ve stated, we are a legitimate stress company which is dedicated to assisting pentesters as well as normal users who in testing their own server's resilience to multiple varieties of attacks.'

Decide for yourself.

Line 1, Column 1

F5 IP Threat Analyzer
Powered by BRIGHTCLOUD® Security Services

Log File: C:\Users\Lubos Klokner\Desktop\IPs-new.txt

File Type: [v] Unique Identifier: [] Delimiter: [v] Item Number: []

Analyze Log File

Results

Inbound Connections	Threats Found	Percentage
14064	392	2,787,258

Count	Threat Types
221	Spam Sources
119	Anonymous Proxies
29	Anonymous Proxies + Spam Sources
9	Anonymous Proxies + Port scanning + Spam Sources
8	Port scanning + Spam Sources
3	Anonymous Proxies + Port scanning
2	Port scanning

Handy Tools



Available tools

Press button and forget

hping3

[illegible]

nmap

[illegible]

killapache.pl

[illegible]

slowloris

[illegible]

metasploit

[illegible]

slowhttptest

[illegible]

High Orbit ION

Low Orbit ION

Dirt Jumper

Dirt Jumper

Time: 09:40:50

All: 00:00

Online: 00:00

URLs:

Flows HTTP-flood: 300

Stop Save

RussKill

The screenshot shows the RussKill application running in a web browser. The title bar indicates the URL is "http://10.10.10.10:8080/". The page has a dark green background with yellow text for the title "RussKill" and red text for the online count "Online: 193". Below the title, there is a "URL:" label and a large white rectangular input field. Underneath the input field, there are two statistics: "Flows HTTP-flood: 0" and "Flows SYN-flood: 455". At the bottom of the page, there are two buttons: "Start" and "Save".

RussKill

Online: 193

URL:

Flows HTTP-flood: 0

Flows SYN-flood: 455

Start

Save

Pandora

Press button and forget

[illegible][illegible][illegible][illegible]

Dirt Jumper

Time: 09:40:50
All: 00:00
Online: 0000


URLs:

Flows HTTP flood: 300

Stop Save

The screenshot shows the RussKill application running in a web browser. The title bar indicates the URL is "http://192.168.1.100:8080/". The main content area has a dark green background with the text "RussKill" in large yellow letters at the top. Below it, the status "Online: 193" is shown in yellow. A label "URL:" is followed by a large white rectangular input field. Below this, there are two status indicators: "Flows HTTP-flood: 0" and "Flows SVN-flood: #55", both in yellow. At the bottom, there are two buttons labeled "Start" and "Save" in white text on a dark green background. A footer bar at the very bottom contains the text "© 2004" and "© 2006" on the left, and "© 2004 12.11.13.0000" and "© 2006 12.11.13.0000" on the right.

Available tools



The screenshot shows the OWASP HTTP Post Tool project page. The page layout includes a left sidebar with navigation links, a main content area with sections for Main, Introduction, Description, and Licensing, and a right sidebar with sections for What is Switchblade, Quick Download, Email List, News and Events, In Print, and Classifications. The top of the page features a navigation bar with links for Log in, Request account, and a search bar.

Page [Discussion](#) [Read](#) [View source](#) [View history](#)

OWASP HTTP Post Tool

Main

OWASP Switchblade

Introduction

OWASP Switchblade is a denial of service tool used for testing the availability, performance and capacity planning of a web application to be proactive about this type of risk condition

Description

The project started in early 2000 as a way to test the capacity of simultaneous users connected to a web application and was not public tool. In 2010 the tool was created by [ProactiveRISK](#) to educate the OWASP Community about the Denial of Service conditions that can exist with Layer7

Licensing

OWASP Switchblade is free to use. It is licensed under the <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/> [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 license], so you can copy, distribute and transmit the work, and you can adapt it, and use it commercially, but all provided that you attribute the work and if you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only

What is Switchblade

OWASP Switchblade provides (3) different types of denial of service conditions that can be tested from a single machine

- SSL Half Connect
- HTTP Post Attack
- Slowloris

Presentation

Link to [presentation](#)

Project Leader

[Tom Brennan](#)

Related Projects

[OWASP Testing Guide](#)

Openhub

Quick Download

- Windows Installer [1]
- [GITHUB](#)

Email List

N/A

News and Events

- [12 June 2015] [Page Updated New Template](#)

In Print

N/A

Classifications

[Builders](#) [Defenders](#)

[OWASP](#) [OWASP](#) [OWASP](#)

Available tools

- erkac@geck\$
- `for i in $(seq 1 1000); do`
- `wget -O /dev/null -m http://site?xyz &`
- `done`

Available tools

```
[erkac@geck]-[~]$ wc -l hulk.py
```

```
155 hulk.py
```

```
[erkac@geck]-[~]$ python hulk.py
```

```
-----  
USAGE: python hulk.py <url>
```

```
you can add "safe" after url, to autoshut after dos
```


```
-----  
[erkac@geck]-[~]$ less hulk.py
```

```
...
```

Available tools

```
# -----  
# HULK - HTTP Unbearable Load King  
#  
# this tool is a dos tool that is meant to put heavy load on HTTP servers in order to bring them  
# to their knees by exhausting the resource pool, its is meant for research purposes only  
# and any malicious usage of this tool is prohibited.  
#  
# author : Barry Shteiman , version 1.0  
# -----
```

How to execute L7 DoS?



We're Hiring!


PricingFeaturesCommunityHelpLog InSign Up

DigitalOcean

Simple Cloud Hosting,
Built for Developers.

Deploy an SSD cloud server
in 55 seconds.

Create Account



DropletsImagesDNSAPISupport

Help⚙


Create Droplet


Droplet Hostname


Select Size


<div>\$5/mo</div> <div>\$0.007/hour</div> <div>512 MB / 1 CPU</div> <div>20 GB SSD Disk</div> <div>1000 GB Transfer</div>	<div>\$10/mo</div> <div>\$0.015/hour</div> <div>1 GB / 1 CPU</div> <div>30 GB SSD Disk</div> <div>2 TB Transfer</div>	<div>\$20/mo</div> <div>\$0.030/hour</div> <div>2 GB / 2 CPUs</div> <div>40 GB SSD Disk</div> <div>3 TB Transfer</div>	<div>\$40/mo</div> <div>\$0.060/hour</div> <div>4 GB / 4 CPUs</div> <div>60 GB SSD Disk</div> <div>4 TB Transfer</div>	<div>\$80/mo</div> <div>\$0.119/hour</div> <div>8 GB / 8 CPUs</div> <div>80 GB SSD Disk</div> <div>5 TB Transfer</div>
<div>\$160/mo</div> <div>\$0.238/hour</div> <div>16 GB / 8 CPUs</div> <div>160 GB SSD Disk</div> <div>6 TB Transfer</div>	<div>\$320/mo</div> <div>\$0.476/hour</div> <div>32 GB / 12 CPUs</div> <div>320 GB SSD Disk</div> <div>7 TB Transfer</div>	<div>\$480/mo</div> <div>\$0.714/hour</div> <div>48 GB / 16 CPUs</div> <div>480 GB SSD Disk</div> <div>8 TB Transfer</div>	<div>\$640/mo</div> <div>\$0.952/hour</div> <div>64 GB / 20 CPUs</div> <div>640 GB SSD Disk</div> <div>9 TB Transfer</div>	


Select Region











Your Droplet

Hostname

Size

Region

Image

Settings

SSH Keys

Create Droplet

Create Account

<https://m.do.co/c/f9d15bf38488>


8 Triple DDoS vs. KrebsOnSecurity

AUG 12

*“When nobody hates you, nobody knows you’re alive.” – **Diplomacy**, by Chris Smither*

During the last week of July, a series of steadily escalating cyber attacks directed at my Web site and hosting provider prevented many readers from being able to reach the site or read the content via RSS. Sorry about that. What follows is a post-mortem on those digital sieges, which featured a mix of new and old-but-effective attack methods.

I still don’t know who was attacking my site or why. It’s not as if the perpetrator(s) sent a love letter along with the traffic flood. There was one indication that **a story** I published just



KrebsOnSecurity

8 Triple DDoS vs. KrebsOnSecurity


AUG 12

*“When nobody hates you, nobody knows you’re alive.” – **Diplomacy**, by Chris Smither*

During the last week, my Web site and blog were hit by a massive DDoS attack. The site or read the obituary on those attack methods.

I still don’t know who was attacking my site or why. It’s not as if the perpetrator(s) sent a love letter along with the traffic flood. There was one indication that a story I published just






Pandora’s creators boast that it only takes 10 PCs infected with the DDoS bot to bring down small sites, and about 30 bots to put down a mid-sized site that lacks protection against DDoS attacks. They claim 1,000 Pandora bots are enough to bring Russian search engine giant yandex.ru to a crawl, but that strikes me as a bit of salesmanship and exaggeration. Prolexic said more than 1,500 Pandora-infected bots were used in the assault on my site.



Different kinds of DDoS Attacks



Types of DDoS Attacks

Layer 7	 Application		OWASP Top 10 (e.g. XSS), Slowloris, Slow Post/Read, HTTP GET/POST floods,...
Layer 6	 Session	 SSL	DNS UDP floods, DNS query floods, DNS NXDOMAIN floods SSL floods, SSL renegotiation, ...
Layer 5		 DNS, NTP	
Layer 4	 Network		SYN/UDP/Conn. floods, PUSH and ACK floods, ICMP/Ping floods, Teardrop, Smurf Attacks, ...
Layer 3			
Layer 2			

Types of DDoS Attacks

Blended



Application



Session



SSL



DNS, NTP




Network

OWASP Top 10 (e.g. XSS),
Slowloris, Slow Post/Read,
HTTP GET/POST floods,...

Volumetric



ISO/OSI and F5 Modules



F5 Multilayer (D)DoS Protection



F5 Networks DDoS Protection

On-premises and cloud-based services for comprehensive DDoS Protection

F5 SILVERLINE DDOS PROTECTION



- Turn on cloud-based service to stop volumetric attacks from ever reaching your network
- Multi-layered L3-L7 DDoS attack protection against all attack vectors
- 24/7 attack support from security experts

When
under
attack


F5 ON-PREMISES DDOS PROTECTION




- Mitigate mid-volume, SSL, or application targeted attacks on-premises
- Complete infrastructure control
- Advanced L7 attack protections

Protect Your Business and Stay Online During a DDoS Attack


F5 Networks DDoS Protection - Reference Architecture




Network DDoS Mitigation




L7 DDoS Mitigation



Cloud DDoS Protection



DDoS Architecture Scrubbing Center



IPv6



IPv6 Story

- RFC2460 – 12/1998
- Challenges
 - Operational
 - Security
- F5 Solution
 - Network
 - DNS



IPv6 Operational Challenges

- Many devices and content will not be IPv6 ready
 - IPv4 and IPv6 are not backwards compatible
- Implement a strategy where both IPv4 and IPv6 co-exist until a complete migration to IPv6
 - IPv4 address management
 - IPv6 migration
- Manage the depletion of IPv4 addresses in
- How to connect IPv6 client to IPv4 services and vice versa
- How to publish IPv4 services for IPv4 client

IPv6 Security Challenges

- Who really knows IPv6?
- Does your firewall vendor really support IPv6?
- Visibility on IPv6
- IPv6 DDoS Mitigation

F5 IPv6 Answers


- Full IPv6 support
- Internal communication on IPv6
- Full Proxy
 - DNS/GTM module
 - Firewall Module
 - ADC Module



F5 Full-Proxy Architecture


IPv4 to IPv6 Network Migration Model

Network migration and application migration




IPv6 and IPv4 Support Included

Simplify IPv6 migrations with an IPv4 / IPv6 gateway



- No need to tunnel
- “no dual stack clients or servers required”
- NAT IPv4 to IPv6 (and vice-versa)
 - Clients can be a mix of IPv4 and IPv6
 - Servers can be a mix of IPv4 and IPv6
- DNS 4-6 / 6-4

DNS 64: IPv6 AAAA to IPv4 A




Deployments of FW+ADC




AFM Benefits

Consolidated datacenter security and application protection




App-centric policy enforcement

- Application access controls
- Simplified policy management
- Extensibility with iRules



DoS protection

- Secure against L3-L4 D/DOS attacks
- 120+ DoS vectors & Hardware-based DoS protections
- Dynamic IP intelligence & Blacklisting
- RTBH & Accelerated IP Shun (auto-blacklisting)
- Port misuses policy



Manageability and Visibility

- High speed customizable FW logs/Syslogs
- Granular reporting on attacks
- Centrally managed with BIG-IQ
- On-demand rules compilation
- Self-tuning DDoS threshold settings
- Simplified NAT/PAT work flows

AFM Benefits

Policies written specifically for applications rather than against network traffic.

- Attaches **policies to the applications** that traffic is ultimately directed towards
- Provides a richer set of attributes and objects for each policy context
- 3-tiered hierarchical policy context
- HTTP, SMTP, FTP, SIP, DNS **protocol validation and enforcement** on granular details
- **Streamlines rule life-cycle management**, reduces misconfiguration, and increases policy effectiveness and visibility



LTM Benefits


Application Fluency

Load Balance

Distribute application load across multiple servers to increase availability

Health Monitoring

Verify health and performance to check the status of applications and resources



Traffic Steering

Direct a particular type of traffic to resources designed to handle that type of workload

Connection Management

Mirror connection and persistence information to prevent interruption in service

LTM Benefits


Performance Optimization

TCP Optimization

Enable state-of-the-art optimization to dramatically improve mobile performance

Emerging Protocols

Leverage new technologies like SPDY, HTTP/2 and WebSockets without re-architecting



Caching

Offload repetitive traffic from application servers to improve performance and scale

Compression

Compress data from applications to reduce traffic and overcome latency

LTM Benefits


SSL Encryption

Data Protection

Encrypt traffic with a choice of ciphers suites based on policy, compliance, or mobile needs

Perfect Forward Secrecy

Protect customer privacy from future decryption with a unique key for each session



Visibility and Control

Remove the blind spot that is created by encryption for inbound and outbound traffic

Key Protection

Protect and manage keys with hardware security modules for physical, virtual, and AWS cloud


FW+ADC Performance

- Network accelerators
- SSL accelerators
- Compression HW
- No useless NGFW features
- Full Proxy
- TMOS




FW+ADC Visibility

- Full network data visibility
- SSL offload and termination
- Provides visibility for 3rd party security devices (IPS, NGFW)
- Emerging protocols
 - HTTP/2
 - SPDY
 - WebSockets
- Protocol Security
 - DNS Tunneling
 - SSH Proxy
- Magic and Miracles



FW+ADC Flexibility


- **iRules**
 - Data Plane - Inspect, transform, and make decisions based application traffic
- **iControl**
 - Management API - Realize new levels of automation and configuration management
- **TMSH/iCall**
 - Control Plane - Automate tasks based on events to improve operations and resource utilization
- **iApps**
 - Application Policies - Define and deploy security, optimization and availability services for applications



01001
11010
10010

F5 Application Delivery Firewall


Using the Right Tool



Characteristics

- **Outbound** user inspection
- UserID and AppID
- Who is doing what?
- 1K users to 10K web sites
- Broad but shallow

BIFURCATION OF FIREWALLS



Characteristics

- **Inbound** application protection
- Application delivery focus
- 1M users to 100 apps
- Narrow but deep
- 12 protocols (HTTP, SSL, etc.)

Using the Right Tool

"Next generation" firewall

**Secures Users when
they are on the
corporate network**

- Outbound user inspection
- UserID and AppID
- Who is doing what?
- 1K users to 10K web sites
- Broad but shallow

BIFURCATION OF FIREWALLS


F5 Application Delivery Firewall

**Secures Apps
wherever they Live**


Characteristics

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- Narrow but deep
- 12 protocols (HTTP, SSL, etc.)


F5 Full Proxy Architecture



F5 Full Proxy Architecture



F5 Full Proxy Architecture



F5 Synthesis

<https://synthesis.f5.com/>

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For further assistance please, contact me:

l.klokner@f5.com | +421 908 755152





SOLUTIONS FOR AN APPLICATION WORLD




BACKUP SLIDES

F5 On-premises DDoS protection

DDoS vectors hardware accelerated

Over 110+ L2/4
DDoS vectors
with majority of
them mitigated in
hardware
(IPI also).

Even with vCMP
enabled.

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DOS CATEGORY	ATTACK NAME	DOS VECTOR NAME	INFORMATION	HARDWARE ACCELERATED
Bad Header - DNS	DNS Oversize	dns-oversize	Detects oversized DNS headers. To tune this value, in tmsh: modify sys db dos.maxdnssize value , where value is 256-8192.	Yes
	DNS Malformed	dns-malformed	Malformed DNS packet	Yes
	DNS QDCount Limit	dns-qdcount-limit	UDP packet, DNS qdcount neq 1, VLAN is <tunable>. To tune this value, in tmsh: modify sys db dos.dnsvlan value , where value is 0-4094.	Yes
Bad Header - ICMP	Bad ICMP Checksum	bad-icmp-chksum	An ICMP frame checksum is bad. Reuse the TCP or UDP checksum bits in the packet	Yes
	Bad ICMP Frame	bad-icmp-frame	The ICMP frame is either the wrong size, or not of one of the valid IP4 or IPv6 types. Valid IPv4 types: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• 0 Echo Reply• 3 Destination Unreachable• 4 Source Quench• 5 Redirect• 8 Echo• 11 Time Exceeded• 12 Parameter Problem• 13 Timestamp• 14 Timestamp Reply• 15 Information Request• 16 Information Reply• 17 Address Mask Request• 18 Address Mask Reply Valid IPv6 types: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• 1 Destination Unreachable• 2 Packet Too Big• 3 Packet Too Big• 4 Destination Unreachable	Yes

Demo TCP SYN Flood - Attack Mitigated in Hardware!

Using LTM flow reaper to mitigate

Reaper Threshold

- Controls when connection reaping occurs
- Uses variety of algorithms
 - 1st: Longest Idle Connections
 - 2nd: Bps/PPS/Throughput Statistics
 - 3rd: Random Eviction
- Always avoids reaping BigIP-initiated connections

TCP SYN Cookies to challenge Client TCP stacks

- Configurable Threshold (Global)
 - Kicks in only when needed

System » Configuration : Local Traffic : General	
Device	Local Traffic
AWS	
Properties	
Auto Last Hop	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enabled
Maintenance Mode	<input type="checkbox"/>
VLAN-Keyed Connections	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enabled
Path MTU Discovery	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enabled
Reject Unmatched Packets	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enabled
Reaper High-water Mark	95 %
Reaper Low-water Mark	85 %
SYN Check™ Activation Threshold	16384 connections

Future Plans

- Per-VS Connection Table Quotas for both ALL flows, and for “Slow” Flows
- Additional User-Specified Reap Choices: Geo-based, Port-Based, Oldest

TCP SYN Flood - AFM signatures mitigation

The screenshot displays the F5 Security Management Center (SMC) interface for configuring DoS Protection. The left sidebar shows the navigation menu with 'Security' expanded and 'DoS Protection' selected. The main panel is titled 'Security » DoS Protection : Device Configuration' and contains a 'Properties' section and a table of attack signatures.

Properties:

- Log Publisher: None
- Auto Threshold Sensitivity: 50 (range 1 to 100)
- Update button


Attack Signatures Table:

Category	Attack Type	Detection Threshold PPS	Detection Threshold Percent	Rate/Leak Limit	Auto Threshold	Bad Actor
Bad Header - DNS						
Bad Header - ICMP						
Bad Header - IGMP						
Bad Header - IPv4						
Bad Header - IPv6						
Bad Header - L2						
Bad Header - TCP						
Bad Header - UDP						
DNS						
Flood						
	ARP Flood	10000	500	100000	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Ethernet Broadcast Packet	10000	500	100000	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Ethernet Multicast Packet	10000	500	100000	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	ICMPv4 flood	10000	500	100000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	ICMPv6 flood	10000	500	100000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	IGMP Flood	10000	500	100000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	IGMP Fragment Flood	100	500	1000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	IPv6 Fragment Flood	Infinite	Infinite	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	IP Fragment Flood	Infinite	Infinite	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Routing Header Type 0	10000	500	100000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	TCP BADACK Flood	1000	500	10000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	TCP PUSH Flood	Infinite	Infinite	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	TCP RST Flood	10000	500	100000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	TCP SYN ACK Flood	500000	Infinite	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	TCP SYN Flood	90000	Infinite	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Network DDoS Attacks - F5 signatures

Category	Attack Type	Detection Threshold PPS	Detection Threshold Percent	Rate/Leak Limit	Auto Threshold	Bad Actor
Bad Header - DNS	DNS Oversize	1000	500	10000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	DNS Malformed	1000	500	10000		
	DNS QDCount Limit	1000	500	Infinite		
Bad Header - ICMP	Bad ICMP Checksum	10	500	100		
	Bad ICMP Frame	1000	500	10000		
	ICMP Frame Too Large	1000	500	10000	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Bad Header - IGMP	Bad IGMP Frame	1000	500	10000		
Flood	ARP Flood	10000	500	100000	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Ethernet Broadcast Packet	10000	500	100000	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Ethernet Multicast Packet	10000	500	100000	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	ICMPv4 flood	10	100	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	ICMPv6 flood	10000	500	100000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	IGMP Flood	10000	500	100000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	IGMP Fragment Flood	100	500	1000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	IPv6 Fragment Flood	Infinite	Infinite	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	IP Fragment Flood	Infinite	Infinite	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Routing Header Type 0	10000	500	100000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	TCP BADACK Flood	1000	500	10000		<input type="checkbox"/>
	TCP PUSH Flood	Infinite	Infinite	Infinite		<input type="checkbox"/>
	TCP RST Flood	25	100	25	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	TCP SYN ACK Flood	500000	Infinite	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	TCP SYN Flood	90000	Infinite	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	TCP SYN Oversize	1000	500	10000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	TCP Window Size	100000	500	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	UDP Flood	400000	Infinite	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Different Network DDoS Attacks



DNS DDoS Mitigation - AFM: DDoS Signatures

+	Category	Attack Type	Detection Threshold PPS	Detection Threshold Percent	Rate/Leak Limit	Auto Threshold	Bad Actor
-	DNS						
		DNS AAAA Query	50000	500	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS Any Query	500	500	2000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS AXFR Query	5000	500	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS A Query	50000	500	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS CNAME Query	5000	500	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS IXFR Query	5000	500	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS MX Query	50000	500	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS NS Query	5000	500	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS OTHER Query	5000	500	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS PTR Query	50000	500	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS Response Flood	10000	500	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS SOA Query	5000	500	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS SRV Query	50000	500	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS TXT Query	500	500	2000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS TXT Query	200	200	2000	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS SRV Query	20000	200	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS SOA Query	2000	200	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		DNS Response Flood	10000	200	Infinite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Application DDoS Mitigation - ASM

Layer 7 HTTP/S DoS attack protection

- Guards against RPS (TPS) and latency-based anomalies
- Provides predictive indicators
- Support IP, geolocation, URL and site wide detection criteria
- Provides heavy URL protection
- Protects against threats proactively
- Simplified reports access and added qkView violations export support
- Advanced Prevention techniques
- Client Side Integrity Defense
- CAPTCHA (HTML or JS response)
- Source IP Blocking
- Geolocation blacklisting

